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ABSTRACT 
 Intrusions pose a serious security risk in a network environment.    New intrusion types, of which 
detection systems are unaware, are the most difficult to detect.  The amount of available network audit data 
instances is usually large; human labeling is tedious, time-consuming, and expensive. Traditional anomaly 
detection algorithms require a set of purely normal data from which they train their model. We present a 
clustering-based intrusion detection algorithm, unsupervised anomaly detection, which trains on unlabeled 
data   in order to detect new intrusions. Our method is able to detect many different types of intrusions, 
while maintaining a low false positive rate as verified over the Knowledge Discovery and Data Mining -
KDD CUP 1999 dataset. 
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1. Introduction   
As defined in [1], intrusion detection is “the 
process of monitoring the events occurring in a  
computer system or network and analyzing  
them for signs of intrusions, defined as attempts 
to compromise the confidentiality, integrity, 
availability, or to bypass the security 
mechanisms of a computer or network”. In figure 
1 depicted intrusion detection taxonomy. 
Intrusion detection is to build a system which 
would automatically scan network activity and 
detect such intrusion attacks. 
Anomaly detection has been an active field of 
intrusion detection research since it was 
originally proposed by Denning [2].  
Unsupervised Anomaly Detection (UAD) 
algorithms have the major advantage of  
being able to process unlabeled data and detect 
intrusions that otherwise could not be detected. 
The goal of data clustering, or unsupervised 
learning, is to discovery a “natural”  
grouping in a set of patterns, points, or objects, 
without knowledge of any class labels. 
We need a technique for detecting intrusions 
when our training data is unlabeled, as well as 
for detecting new and unknown types of 
intrusions. 
 
There are generally two types of attacks in 
network intrusion detection: the attacks that 
involve single connections and the attacks that 
involve multiple connections (bursts of 
connections) [3] [4]. In misuse detection, each 
instance in a data set is labeled as ‘normal’ or 
‘intrusion’ and a learning algorithm are trained 
over the labeled data. A key advantage of misuse 
detection techniques is their high degree of 
accuracy in detecting known attacks and their 
variations.  Their obvious drawback is the 
inability to detect attacks whose instances have 
not yet been observed. [4] Misuse detection can 
only detect attacks that are well known and for 
which signatures have been written. 
An anomaly detection technique builds models 
of normal behavior, and automatically detects 
any deviation from it, flagging the latter as 
suspect. A potential drawback of these 
techniques is the rate of false alarms [4]. 
Attacks fall into four main categories [8]:  
− DoS : denial-of-service, for example ping-of- 
   death, teardrop, smurf, SYN flood, etc., 
− R2L : unauthorized access from a remote  
   machine, for example guessing password, 
− U2R : unauthorized access to local super user  
    (root) privileges, for example, various “buffer    
    overflow” attacks,  
− PROBING: surveillance and other probing, for  
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example, port-scan, ping-sweep, etc. Some of the 
attacks (e.g. denial of service (DoS), probing) 
may use hundreds of  network packets or 
connections, while on the other hand attacks like 
U2R and R2L typically use only one or a few 
connections.[3]  
       Denial-of-service attacks 
       Denial of Service (DoS) is a class of  attacks 
where an attacker makes some computing or 
memory resource too busy or too full to handle 
legitimate requests. A denial of service attack 
can be argued to have a distinct set of features 
and patterns that manifest themselves when 
examine packets on the network[5] 
      Remote to User Attacks 
      A remote to user (R2L) attack is class  
of attacks where an attacker sends packets  
to a machine over a network, then exploits 
machine’s vulnerability to illegally gain local 
access a user.  
      User to Root Attacks 
      User to root exploits is a class of attacks  
where an attacker starts out with access to a 
normal user account on the system and is able to 
exploit vulnerability to gain root access to the 
system.  Most common exploits in this class of 
attacks are regular buffer overflows, which are 
caused by regular programming mistakes and 
environment assumptions.  
       Probing 
       Probing is a class of attacks where an 
attacker scans a network to gather information or 
find known vulnerabilities. An attacker with a 
map of machines and services that are available 
on a network can use the information to look for 
exploits.  
 
2. The Our approach 
 
2.1 Unsupervised learning 
Unsupervised learning methods analyze each 
event to determine how similar (or dissimilar) 
depends on the choice of similarity measures, 
dimension weighting. The interesting feature of 
clustering is the possibility to learn without 
knowledge of attack classes, thereby reducing 
training data requirement, and possibly making 
clustering based techniques more viable than 
classification-based techniques in a real world 
setting. 
 
Methods for unsupervised anomaly detection do 
not assume that the data is labeled or somehow 
otherwise sorted according to classification [5]. 
Problem of unsupervised intrusion detection [6]. 
First, they modified the data significantly by 
limiting the number of attacks to 1 ~ 1.5 % of the 
complete training dataset so that their 
hypothetical assumption is true. Second, each 
cluster is self-labeled as attacks or normal, based 
purely on the number of instances in it. Finally, 
the idea of detecting intrusions in a new dataset 
using the self-labeled clusters of the training 
dataset seems misguided. Certain attacks, such as 
Denial of Service and scanning can produce 
large amounts of attack data. Those two cases 
falsify the assumption of unsupervised anomaly 
detection and need to be handled separately [7].  
 
 
2.2 Clustering 
An ideal case is to group related data (measured 
by a distance function) into the same cluster and 
unrelated data into different clusters. More 
efficient algorithms like K-Means and EM, 
which have linear cost per iteration, also need 
scale-up before they can be applied to very large 
data sets. An example of clustering is depicted in 
Figure 2. The input patterns are shown in Figure 
2(a) and the desired clusters are shown in Figure 
2(b). 
 
3 UAD model  
 
Unsupervised Anomaly Detection (UAD) model 
have 6 steps: 
3.1 Dataset Description 
The DARPA 99 is various intrusions simulated 
in a military network environment. It has 
4,900,000 data instances and connection is a 
sequence of TCP packets to and from some IP 
addresses. Basic features of individual TCP 
connections are duration, protocol type, number 
of bytes transferred, the flag indicating the 
normal or error status. Content features within a 
connection suggested by domain knowledge 
such as the number of file creation operations, 
number of failed login attempts. Traffic features 
computed using a two-second time window are 
the number of connections to the same host, 
percent of connections that have “SYN” and 
“REJ” errors.  
3.2 Normalization 
Convert the data instances to a standard form 
based on the training dataset's distribution 
instance[j]-avg_vector[j]
new_instance[j]=
std_vector[j]
 
avg_vector[j] = 1/N ∑instance [j]  
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std_vector[j] = {1/(N-1) ∑(instance[j] – 
avg_vector[j]2)}1/2 
vector[j] : the j th  element(feature) of the vector 
 
3.3 Metric 
   - Finding or constructing an appropriate metric 
is critical to the performance of the method 
   - Experiment with several weighted metrics 
   - In the end, use a metric with equally weighted 
features. Some increase in performance from 
weighted metrics is not a significant amount and 
undermine the system’s generality.  
3.4 Clustering 
- Variant of single-linkage clustering 
- Assume we have fixed a metric M, and a 
constant cluster width W.  
- Let dist(C,d), where C is a cluster and d is an 
instance, be the distance under the metric M, 
between C’s defining instance (as the centroid) 
and d 
      1. Initialize the set of clusters, S, to the 
empty set 
      2. Obtain a data instance (feature vector) d 
from the training set  
2.1 If S is empty, then create a cluster 
with d as the defining instance, and add 
it to S.  
2.2 Otherwise, find the cluster C in S, 
such that for all C1 in S,  
 dist(C,d) <= dist(C1,d) 
        3. If dist(C,d) <= W, then associate d with 
the cluster C. Otherwise, new cluster must be 
created for it : S ← S {Cn}, Cn is a cluster 
with d as its defining instance 
∪
        4. Repeat steps 2 and 3, until no instances 
are left in the training set 
3.5 Labeling clusters 
Some percentage N of the clusters containing the   
largest number of instances associate with them 
as ‘normal’. 
3.6 Detection 
      - Convert d based on the statistical 
information of the training set form which the 
clusters were created. Let d′ be the instance after 
conversion. 
      - Find a cluster C which is closest to d′ under 
the metric M. 
      - Classify d′ according to the label of C 
(normal or anomalous). 
 
4. Conclusion 
Standard measures for evaluating IDSs are first, 
detection rate (i.e. how many attacks we detected 
correctly). second, the false alarm rate (i.e. how 
many of normal connections we incorrectly 
detected correctly). Third, trade-off between 
detection rate and false alarm rate.  
Fouth,performance(Processing 
speed+propagation+reaction).  
Finally, Fault Tolerance (resistant to attacks, 
recovery, resist subversion). Detection rate is 
computed as the radio between the number of 
correctly detected attacks and the total number of 
attacks, while false alarm (false positive) rate is 
computed as the ratio between the numbers of 
normal connections that are incorrectly 
misclassified as attacks [3]. Clustering is suitable 
for anomaly detection, since no knowledge of the 
attack classes is needed whilst training [7]. 
Standard metrics that were developed for 
evaluating network intrusions usually correspond 
to detection rate as well as false alarm rate 
(Table 1). 
 
Table1.Standard metrics for evaluations of 
intrusions (attacks) 
 
Predicted connection label Confusion matrix 
(Standard metrics) Normal Intrusion (Attacks) 
Normal True 
Negative(TN) 
False Alarm (FP) 
Actual 
connection 
label 
Intrusions 
(Attacks) 
False 
Negative(FN) 
Correctly 
detected attacks 
(TP) 
From Table 1, recall, precision and F-value may 
be defines as follows : 
 
Precision = TP / (TP + FP) 
Recall     = TP / (TP + FN) 
2
2
(1 ).Recall.Precision
.Recall+Precision
F value
β
β
+− =  
  
Where β  corresponds to relative importance of 
precision vs. recall and it is usually set to 1 [9]. 
 
ROC Curves (in Figure 3.) is a trade-off between 
detection rate and false alarm rate. It is plot for 
different false alarm rates. Ideal system should 
have 100% detection rate with 0% false alarm 
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Figure 2. Data Clustering 
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Figure 4: UAD Model 
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Figure 1. Intrusion Detection Taxonomy 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Proceedings of the Postgraduate Annual Research Seminar 2005 253
